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[1] 
§249. 
A. ?\ o. 23276. In Bank. June 6, 
J. 
was "for and in consideration of the 
division and settlement of all 
and nature, whether 
THOMAS T. 
§ 63; Am.Jur., Husband 
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[3a, 3b] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties. 
-Where provisions for support and maintenance 
an integral and inseverable part of a 
agreement, her express promise not to seek 
than as provided in such agreement cannot be 
out changing the agreement; and since such 
the consideration for the husband's 
payments, he likewise cannot 
thereof without changing the property settlemrnt a'"CLCWCU 
[4] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement Agreements-Inter-
pretation.-In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence as 
to the meaning of a property settlement agreement, 
eourt's interpretation is not binding on the 
[5] !d.-Property Settlement Agreements- In1cerprE:ta1ciOJ1.--Ii 
the purpose of determining the meaning of a ""'""'w'" 
ment agreement, the value of accounts receivable 
the husband that is material is the value estimated 
parties in their agreement, not the value estimated 
court three years later. 
[6] !d.-Property Settlement Agreements-Consideration.--Sinee 
at the time a property settlement agreement is the 
parties may be uncertain as to which of their property is 
community rather than separate, and they will ordinarily not 
know how the court in a divorce action will find the facts or 
how it would, in the absence of an acceptable 
cise its diseretion in dividing the property and ali-
mony, the amicable adjustment of these doubtful questions 
with respect to property and support and maintenance 
of the parties may alone Rupply sufficient consideration to 
support their entire agreement. 
[7] Divorce -Permanent Alimony - Modification of Allowance: 
Disposition of Community Property.-Where secured 
her divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, had the parties 
not settled their rights by agreement the court in its dis-
cretion could have awarded plaintiff all of the 
property and less alimony than she received under the agree-
ment, in which case the alimony would be subjc>ct to reduction 
in the event of changed circumstances. 
[8] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
A wife is entitled to agree to an equal division of vvJ.llllm<u 
property in exchange for support and maintenance 
that cannot be reduced; accordingly, the fact that community 
property is substantially divided equally has no on the 
validity of the provision of the agreement whereby both 
waive all rights to support and maintcnanee othc>r thnn as pro-
vided therein. 
[9] !d.-Enforcement of Awards-Execution: Contempt.--Where 
there was evidence that defendant had bern twice married 
621 
lll"''"'"':u ll'ratltl(ie on which an exeeu-
""'","-"' .. "" could be and 
nel3eSI>it~ttirtg loss time 
finding that 
is not in of Court," 
cv1.nu"""'""·'.Y S11lS1J•endrrtg the issuance of a writ of exeeu-
!d.-Enforcement of Awards-Exeeutio:il.-Under Civ. 
amended in 1951, the trial court has discretion to de-
termnle whether execution is an appropriate for en-
its order for support payments to a wife granted a 
for the husband's offense, and it was not an abuse of 
diseretmn to condition the issuance of execution on the hus-
nOJ:lCompliaJace with an order to discharge arrearages 
installments where the court found on sufficient evidence 
the issuance and enforcement of a writ of 
""~"m'''vu would discredit the husband professionally and im-
to make the monthly payments and discharge 
from a judgment and order of the Superior Court 
purporting to amend a property settlement 
uv•u~ub defendant not in contempt of court, and 
issuance of execution. Clark Clement, Judge. 
UUtSJ.U'0UV amending provisions of property settlement 
interlocutory judgment based thereon, 
judgment and order appealed 
Herbert M. Braden and Lawrence W. 
for Respondent. 
J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in 
pcua'""' in 1950. On January 3, 1951, they exe-
yw,nn•>rr·.r settlement agreement. Thereafter plaintiff 
for divorce, and on January 8, 1951, an 
"""r"'f'':r decree was granted to her on the ground of 
The decree approved and incorporated by 
the provisions of the agreement and expressly 
defendant to pay $500 per month ''as agreed in said 
uLHa.utou" agreement.'' The final decree was entered 
16, 1952. 
defendant was not in 
the overdue The court 
execution should not be issued the 
the that he "has no or 
successfully 
manner in which such execution could 
be served would be by placing a constable in charge of the 
of the defendant; and, as the defendant is a 
professional man, this Court finds that such an action ·would 
result in considerable discredit to the defendant; and the 
court further believes if such action were taken, that the 
of the defendant a physician and surgeonl 
would be reduced to such a degree that it would materially 
affect the ability of the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the 
reduced as set by this Court.'' The court ordered that 
the settlement agreement be amended to provide 
for the payment of $375 per month, and income tax on an 
income of $4,500 per year instead of $500 per month and in-
come tax on an income of $6,000 per year. It found that the 
amount due plaintiff from defendant to March 10, 1954, was 
$5,668 and ordered defendant to pay $800 on or before that 
date and $50 per month in addition to the reduced alimony 
payments to be applied on the balance due. The issuance of 
execution was suspended so long as defendant made these pay-
ments, but in the event of default, an execution was to issue 
forthwith. 
Plaintiff She contends that the provisions for 
monthly payments and income tax payments were an integral 
and inseparable part of the property settlement agreement 
of the parties and are therefore not subject to modification. 
Tn their the parties provided: 
""WHEREAS, thA parties hereto are husband and wife, and 
that said parties hereto have agreed to divide an property 
and property rights between them; and 
"\VnEREAs, said parties do not make any arrangement or 
arrangements as to any divorce proceedings by eit!1er of the 
tax. 
mrnt. 
or 
covenant and 
to wit '' 
provided for a division of the 
proceeding the trial court found 
received worth and that de-
received property worth 
3 "That the husband agrees to pay to 
for her care, maintenance and the sum of 
Fvn"'"'" ($300.00) Dor~JJARS per month, monthly 
commencing 011 ,T anuary 3rcl, 1951, receipt of 
month's alimony is hereby aeknowledgcd, sueh 
to pay to eontinu0 until the ;,vife dies or remarries." 
15 provided ''That the husband agrees that 
hereof he will pay to the wife a sufficient amount 
above the FIVE HuxDRED ) DoLLARS per 
, lJCrein agreed to be paid, to pay the income 
any, to be paid by the wife on said alimony pay-
" 
also provided that "It is further nnderstood 
and that the \Yife relinquishes, abandons, and 
rclea,;c·s a 1l of her right, title and interest in and to any and all 
·which is hereinbefore agreed shall be set apart to 
the property of the husband, and to any and all 
n"''""'"'" of evrry nature ·which said husband now has or that 
or own, 
and support from or 
herein otherwise 
and aU to future 
the said husband, ex-
provkled, and hereby 
to inherit any prop-
;dmtsoeyer now owns or possesses 
he may hereafter own or possess, or of ,,·hich he may 
and an property which is hereinbefore 
624 lVIESSENGER V. 1VJ:ESSENGER 
set to him shall be and remain forever 
parties hereto the separate property of the husband.'' A 
similar provision related to the husband, that his 
of all right to future support and maintenance was not 
fied by the clause, ''except as herein otherwise 
provided.'' 
Plaintiff's complaint referred to the $500 per pay-
ments as alimony and prayed that the court approve 
property settlement agreement, make it of the 
and order defendant to pay $500 per month "for the 
maintenance and support of the plaintiff, as therein 
The interlocutory decree approved the agreement, made it 
part of the decree by reference, and expressly ordered de-
fendant to pay $500 per month ''for the care, 
and support of the plaintiff, as agreed in said property settle-
ment agreement." The final decree provided that "It is 
further ordered and decreed that wherein said 
decree makes any provision for alimony'' said ''be 
and the same is hereby made binding on the parties affected 
thereby the same as if herein set forth in full, and that 
wherein said interlocutory decree relates to the property of 
the parties hereto, said property be and the same is hereby 
assigned in accordance with the terms thereof to the parties 
therein declared to be entitled thereto. 
"IT Is FuRTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the 
community property of the parties hereto is ordered divided, 
in accordance with the property settlement agreement ap-
proved in the Interlocutory Decree entered herein and the 
order for support payments as are provided for therein are 
hereby ratified and confirmed." 
Since the final decree merely confirms the provisions of 
the interlocutory decree and the property settlement agree-
ment, and since the interlocutory decree ordered that the pay-
ments be made ''as agreed in said property settlement agree-
ment," we must examine the agreement to determine whether 
the provisions for monthly payments and income tax pay-
ments are separable from the provisions that divide the 
property, or whether they are an integral and inseparable 
part of the division of property and therefore an inseparable 
part of the consideration for the property settlement. If 
they fall into the latter category they cannot now be modified. 
(De.J:ter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 40-41 [265 P.2d : Ailarns 
v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621, 625 [177 P.2d 265].) 
[1] In support of his contention that the fall 
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defendant stresses the fact that 
for the wife's support are 
1 , 1 3,2 and 153 as alimony and 
characteristics of alimony in that 
wife dies or remarries. Similar con-
Dexfel· v. De:cter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 41 
42 Cal.2d r52-53 
out that the labels adopted by 
and agreed as to this policy [life insurance] that 
reverses ot other reasons beyond the control of the 
is nceessary to borrow money thereon for the purpose of 
alimony hereinafter agreed to be paid by the husband, but 
the husband may borrow on said policy for the 
alimony, but for no other purpose .... " (Italics 
lmslmnrl agrees to pay to the wife for her care, mainte· 
the sum of FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS per 
monthly in advance, commencing on January 3rd, 1951, 
whieh first month's alimony is hereby acknowledged, such 
pay to continuo until the wife dies or remarries.'' (Italics 
the husband agrees that from date hereof he will pay to the 
sufficient amount over anrl above the FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) 
month herein agreed to be paid, to pay the in· 
to ho tho wife on said alimony payment .... '' 
intiff contends, however, that since the monthly payments were 
on her death or remarriage and were described as alimony 
of her complaint, they should be so treated. She points out 
were intended as a division of property it would have been 
for the agreement to provide that they should continue 
amount had. been paid. These considerations would be more 
the issue presented was whether, on the one hand, the 
pnymcnts were solely part of a division of the community prop· 
on the other hand, solely alimony. \Vhen, as in this case, how· 
have made the provision for support and maintenance 
of their property settlement agreement, the monthly 
ordinarily haYo a dual character. To the extent that 
to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance 
reflect tbe eharacteristics of that obligation and thus 
alimony. [Citations.] On the other hand, to the 
tlwt they represent a division of the community property itself, 
inseparable part of the consideration for the property 
are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified 
the terms of the property settlement agreement of the 
eontends, however, that since the payments were labeled 
wrre to cease on her remarriage, and were subject to modifica-
evcnt of a rednrtion of defendant's pension, there is evidence 
the trinl comt'f1 implied finding that they were solely alimony 
to moclificatio11. . The labels adopted by the parties are 
8inco tlw must be considered as a whole. rcita· 
ont in tlH' Dexter case, to the extent tllfe 
v. 
supra, at pp. that the support 
aud maintenance provided in paragraph 3, like the division 
of in paragraphs 1 and 2, was "for 
and in consideration of the permanent and division and 
settlement of all their property rights of every kind and 
nature, whether separate or community " 
[3a] :!\foreover, as in Fox v. supra, at page the 
wife waived "all right to future maintenance and support 
from or the said husband, except as herein otherwise pro-
vided," in paragraph 3. Her express promise not to seek 
alimony except as provided in the agreement could not ''be 
abrogated without changing· the property settlement agree-
ment of the parties." (Ibicl.) Similarly, since this waiver 
'vas part of the consideration for the husband's agreement to 
make the support payments, he likewise could not seek a 
modification thereof without changing the settle-
ment agreement of the parties. It is clear, that if 
the parties meant the maintenance and support provisions to 
be alimony separable from a division of the property they 
would not have included this waiver Helvern v. 
139 Oal.App.2d 819, 829-830 [294 P.2d 482]), for an order 
allowing alimony is subject to revision at any time. (Hough 
v. Hough, 26 Oal.2d 605, 612 r160 P.2d 15] .) 
[ 4] In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence as to 
the meaning of the the trial court's interpreta-
tion of it is not binding on this court. v. 42 Cal. 
2d 49, 52 [265 P.2d 881 J ; Estate Platt, 21 Oal.2d 343, 352 
r131 P.2d 825] .) The evidence offered and introduced in 
this case was coneerned primarily with defendant's ability to 
monthly payments are designed to discharge the obligation of 
and maintenance, they will ordinarily have some of the 
alimony.'' 
com-
its conclusion that the 
of the consideration for 
were therefore to 
u"'""""' was based on a reevaluation of the 
to defendant under the agree-
the the parties estimated the value of 
at $15,000. The trial court estimated their value 
It is obvious that for the purpose of determining 
of the the value that is material is the 
in their agreement, not the 
estimated the court three years later. 
Even if the evidence had showed that when the parties 
their understood that plaintiff would 
worth $82,850 and defendant would receive 
it would not support the conclusion 
were subject to modification. 'l'he agree-
" permanent and lasting division" of all 
in as well as community property. 
As stated in Dexte1· v. at p. 43) "[A lt 
a property settlement is made, the parties may be 
to which of their property is community rather 
and will ordinarily not know ho>v the court 
divorce action will find the facts or how it would, in 
nhsencc of an exercise its discretion 
the and a\varding alimon?. The amicable 
doubtful questions with respect to the 
and maintenance rights of the parties 
sufficient consideration to Rnpport their 
f Citation.] Thus in the present case, the 
recited that desired to settle their property and 
maintenance rights 'by friendly agreement, in-
to court for said purpose.' [7] Moreover, 
}1ESSENUER V. 
secured her divorce 
the not settled 
the court could in its discretion 
all of the community property and less 
received under her In 
alimony would be subject to reduction in the 
circumstances. [8] Plaintiff was entitled to 
an equal division of the community ~~A~A'''"' 
support and maintenance payments that could 
Accordingly, the fact that the 
divided equally has no bearing on the 
of the agreement whereby both parties waived all 
support and maintenance other than as therein. 
[Citations.]" In the present case the very fact that the find-
ing of the respective values was based on evidence 
indicates that the parties were in doubt as to the value of 
their property and that they meant what they said when they 
provided that both the division of their and the 
monthly payments were "for and in consideration of the 
permanent and lasting division and settlement of all their 
property rights of every kind and nature .... " Moreover, 
in the absence of the agreement the court could have awarded 
plaintiff all of the community property and less alimony, 
and just as in the Dexter case, she was entitled to agree in-
stead to a substantially equal division of the community prop-
erty in exchange for support and maintenanee payments that 
could not be reduced. 
[2b, 3b] When as in this case the parties have clearly ex-
pressed their "purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal 
and property rights," have provided that the provision for 
alimony is "for and in consideration of the permanent and 
lasting division and settlement of all their rights 
of every kind and nature," and the wife has waived "all 
right to future maintenanee and support ... , exeept as 
herein otherwise expressly provided," the conclusion is in-
escapable that they have made the provisions for support and 
maintenance an integral and inseparable part of their prop-
erty settlement agreement. With such conclusive evidence of 
integration, the provisions for support and maintenance or 
alimony would be subject to modification only if the parties 
expressly so provided. (See Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 CaL 
2d 55, 61, and cases cited.) The court may however, 
"insert what has been omitted" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858) and 
MESSENGER V. MESSENGER 
[ 46 C.2d 619; 297 P.2d 988] 
629 
of the 
contends that the trial court erred in failing 
of court and in conditionally 
issuance of a writ of execution. There was 
had been twice married after his 
that he had no assets other than the 
medical upon which an execution 
and that he had suffered a partial stroke 
loss of time from his practice. On the basis 
and evidence of defendant's income and 
the trial court was justified in finding that de-
">d1ile in arrears, is not in contempt of Court," and 
financial obligations of said defendant have been 
nature so as to have prevented the payment of the 
each and every month." 
""Qnn.~+ to the question of execution, both parties rely 
Y. 29 Ca1.2d 144 [173 P.2d 657], and 
v Di Corpo. 33 Cal.2d 195 [200 P.2d 529], dealing 
to execution on an installment judgment under 
of section 681 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
stated in the I.~ohman case that "AJthough issuance of 
upon a judgment requiring monthly payments may 
upon equitable grounds, proof that the installments 
nccrued 'lvithin fiye years6 establishes a prima facie right 
and the bnrdrn is cast upon the judgment debtor 
faets justifying an order denying the writ'' 
at and in the Di Corpo ease that "Thus, upon 
that installments have accrued within 
the burden was upon defendant to establish facts 
an order rrealling the writ." (33 Cal.2d at 201.) 
however, that it is unnecessary to de-
whether i!rf<'ndant has met the burden referred to 
section 139 of the Civil Code provided that 
a divorre is granted for an offense of the husband, 
may compel him to provide for the maintenance 
children of the marriage, and to make such suitable 
to the wife for hrr support, during her life or for 
as the court may deem jnst, having regard to 
of the parties respectively .... " An order 
of Civil Proeednre section 681 was amended in 19.55 to provide 
instead of a !i-year period. 
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""Whenever an order for the pay-
ment of a sum of money is made court to the 
of this it may be enforced 
the same manner as if it were 
[10] In section 139 
discretion to determine in each case whether execution is an 
for its order. In the present 
case the court found on sufficient evidence that to the 
issuance and enforcement of a writ of execution would dis-
credit defendant professionally and his to make 
the monthly payments and discharge the arrearages. Accord-
it did not abuse its discretion in the 
issuance of execution on defendant's with 
its order to discharge the arrearages in installments. 
To the extent that the judgment modifies the 
of the property settlement and the 
and final decree based thereon it is reversed. In all other 
respects the judgment is affirmed. Each side shall bear its 
own costs on this appeal. 
Gibson, C. and McComb, concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in tl1e conclusion reached in the 
majority opinion. I do not, however, agree with the reasoning 
leading thereto. 
I said in my dissent in Dexter v. De.ccter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 46 
[265 P.2d 873], that this court " ... had an opportunity 
to clarify the law so that stability might be given to property 
settlement agreements and agreements for support and main-
tenance. Not only do the majority holdings in these three 
cases v. Fox, 42 Oal.2d 49 (265 P.2d ; Dexter v. 
Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36 (265 P.2d 873); Flynn v. Flynn, 42 
Cal.2d 55 (26!5 P.2d 1 not settle the but add 
untold confusion." I said in my dissent in the case 
( 42 Cal.2d 62, that the holding of the there 
was an effective trap designed to catch both wary and un-
631 
was ()Xecutcd-whether 
of a 
Ill-
and th ercfore 
ease under consideration, we haYe the majority 
the judgment of the trial court insofar as it modified 
of tbc "property settlement agreement." 'l'he 
eonrt had coneluded that the monthly payments pro-
lvere al and therefore subject to modification. 
here eoncludes that the monthly payments 
of the property settlement agreement 
and there fore not subject to modification. The following 
si ement from the majority opinion leads the way to end-
between these parties and others in the same 
''In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence 
of the the trial court's inter-
of it is not binding on this conrt. (Po:x; v. Pox, 
'a1.2d 49, 52 [2G5 P.2d 881]; Estate Platt, 21 Cal.2d 
ll~n P.2d .) " The error in permitting this 
and relitigatecl 1vhm the parties ob-
intended a and complete determination of their 
rights leads to this r(•sult: The trial court here 
that the monthly payments were alimony; the Dis-
tri<·T Conrt of Appeal concluded that the payments were an 
part of a property settlement agreement and this 
l:Ol!rt is now also so holding. By its holding, the case is 
now set at large and there must be a retrial of the matter. 
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On the new trial, other evidence may be 
will have a bearing on what the parties intended 
entered into the agreement. If new evidence introduced 
which shows that the parties thought 
for alimony or support and maintenance 
wife, the trial court may again decide that such payments 
were alimony and subject to modification; the District 
of .Appeal might affirm the holding of the trial 
it is highly probable that this court 
that such payments were an integrated part of 
settlement agreement and again set the case at 
new triaL This one issue has already been passed upon by 
the courts of this state four times-once when the divorce 
was granted; again by the trial court when the wife applied 
for an order of execution; next by the District Court of 
.Appeal, and next, but far from last, by this court. This 
interminable and expensive litigation all stems from the hold-
ing of a majority of this court that the question of what 
the parties intended when they entered into their agreement 
is one of fact which may be relitigated at some future time. 
I have been advised by trial judges from all over the state 
that they find the rules set forth in the Fox, Dexter and 
Flynn cases extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply 
in the various situations presented to them in actions for 
divorce. So long as this condition exists, this court will have 
the added burden of endeavoring to correct the honest errors 
made by trial courts in this type of case. This situation 
could be very easily remedied if this court would formulate 
definite understandable rules to guide la··wyers and the judges 
of the numerous superior courts of this state. 
This court has not seen fit to correct its previous errors 
but, on the contrary, added to the general confusion with 
its holding in the case under consideration. It is at once 
apparent from a glance at the signatures on the opinions in 
all of these cases that trial judges and attorneys are not 
the only ones who are confused as to the holdings in the Fox, 
Dexter and Flynn eases. Here, we have Mr. Justice Shenk, 
who signed Mr. Justice Traynor's opinions in the Fox, Dexter 
and Flynn cases, dissenting· from his opinion herein. In 
passing, it should be mentioned that, in my opinion, Mr. 
Justice Shenk in his dissent correctly applies the rules set 
forth in the Fox and Flynn cases that the trial court could 
take extrinsic evidence iu aid of its interpretation of the 
tr 
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and that its conclusion based thereon was 
evidence and should not be disturbed on 
G83 
Code, sections 158, 159 and 175, all authorize con-
tract,: between husband and wife. Under the 1aw 
it be a very simple matter for this court to down 
understandable and workable rules of law applicable to agree-
mente; for property settlement, alimony, and and 
in divorce and separate maintenanc-e cases. Such 
would permit lawyers properly to a(1vise their 
permit husbands and wives seeking divorce who arn 
and intelligently endeavoring to make a division 
of property, and arrangements for support anfl main-
tenaner, to do so without fear tltat snch arrangements would 
be ehanged b,\' a trial, or· an appellate court. 'rherc 
appears to me to he no sound reason why contracts between 
such parties should not, in the absence of fraud or over-
be given the same stability and dignity accorded to 
contracts entered into between persons not so related. 
The rule of lavY I should like to see in effect in California 
in type of case is very simple and easy of application. 
\Yhere the parties have entered into an agreement for a 
division of their property, or where one has agreed to give, 
and the other to receive, periodic payments in lien of a 
dh·ision of their property, or in conjunction with a division 
of thrir property, or for support and maintenance, or alimony, 
thr agreement so entered into if approvPd by the court as 
fair, and equitable and not the result of any fraud or 
overreaching, should be the sum total of the parties' rights 
and liabilities and should not be subject to modification 
unlrss the parties have expressly provided for a later modi-
fication, or unle!'>s a subsequent modif~ring agreement is exe-
t'ntr•l them. 
fn a divorer: aetion, when the partif'R have ('ntered into an 
agTer:mf'nt invohi ng tl1eir property rightr-;, i he ronrt should 
into the facts surrounding the rxecution thereof to 
ascertain whether there has been any fraud or overreaching. 
The court should also inquire into the terms and provisions 
of the agreement to determine whether it is fair, ;just and 
equitable. When the court approves the contraet as fair, just 
and equitable and determines that there has been no fraud 
Dexter (:USe it should be rememl>ered t!tat the majority, wllil" 
ho!t1iug that the trial eourt could determine the <·haraeter of the monthly 
payments involved, affirmed the trial court's action in sustaining de-
fendant's objection to the introduction of evidence on that issue. 
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or the matter should be forever concluded and 
the parties bound the terms of their agreement. 
Stated simply, the foregoing proposed rules mean only 
this: That the parties have entered into an agreement which 
the court has approved as fair and equitable and not the 
result of fraud or overreaching; that such agreement should 
be accorded the same finality and dignity as contracts entered 
:into between 
If the above rules were in effect in the prob-
lem of incorporation would also be a very simple one. In 
my opinion there is no incorporation of an agreement in a 
divorce decree unless that agreement has been copied therein 
in haec vet·ba, or its substance is stated therein, or unless a 
copy of the agreement is attached physically to the decree 
of divorce and referred to as being a part thereof. When 
there has been an effective incorporation of the agreement 
in the judgment, the agreement is merged therein and the 
effect is to make the remedy one upon the judgment rather 
than by separate action on the agreement itself. Incorpora-
tion should have absolutely no effect so far as the parties' 
agreement is concerned. The agreement is a contract and 
its terms should govern. If the decree orders compliance 
with the terms of the agreement which has been incorporated 
in the judgment, the only result should be in the form of 
remedy available to the party seeking to enforce the judg-
ment. (Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 158 [124 P.2d 
5].) 
It is at once apparent that if the above rules had been 
applied in the instant case, we would not have the chaos 
and confusion here present. Here it is evident that the 
parties intended a final settlement of their property rights 
at the time the agreement \Vas executed. The holding of the 
majority here destroys the effectiveness of the agreement 
solemnly entered into by the parties and leaves their property 
and rights in a state of uncertainty and confusion. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment and order. 
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-! am unable to agree with that 
portion of the opinion which holds that the alimony pay-
ments to the wife were integrated in the property settlement 
agreement and were therefore not subject to modification as 
provided in section 139 of the Civil Code. 
A property settlement agreement should be construed as 
any other agreement. Here the parties were dealing at arm's 
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uot fall 
be 
and as 
to the power of the court 
accordance with tl1c provisions of section them 
Code. "Where in the agreement there is a clear inten-
waive them or to intrgrate and settle them as part 
of all marital and property rights, the right of 
to so contract is recognized. Here, as properly 
the court, there was no such intention. The parties 
and with obvious design used the word "alimony" 
in agreement. That word ordinarily means an allow-
anee made to the wife by her husband for her support after 
a dissolution of their marriage by divorce. It is used frc-
in our statutes as incorporated in our official codes. 
For example, it is specifically employed in sections 137, 140 
anc1142 of ihe Civil Codn. Jn our decisional law it has been 
used repeatedly in its on1inary sense. It must be assumed 
that it was used in its ordinary sense throughout this pro-
It was first used by the parties in their agreement, 
which lH'OYides that the defenrlant shall pay to the plaintiff 
per month as "alimon~·" for her "support and main-
, and provides that ihese payments shall continue 
"until the wife dies or remarries." Then in her complaint 
for di yorce the wife asked for an mYard of "alimony" in 
this same sum. She prayed that the property settlement 
be approved and made a part of the decree and 
court order the defendant to pay her $500 per month 
care, maintenance and support "as therein agreed." 
The interlocutory decree approyed the property settlement 
and incorporated it by reference in the judgment 
and ordered that the defenc1ant pay to the plaintiff $500 
month for her "carr, maintenance and ;mpport ... as 
in said property settlement agreement ... until the 
dies or remarries .... " The \Yord "support" as 
in section 139 of the Civil Code of course means alimony. 
final decree of divorce specifically states that "wherein 
[4G U.2d 
decree makes any provision for alimony 
made binding on the affectecl 
herein set forth in full.'' 'fhose t1f~erres havP 
lweome finaL 
Jhe am! by the court of the descriptive 
term and phrases "alimony," "care, main-
and snpport" and "until the plaintiff dies or re-
" should not be disregarded and should be determina-
in <lf: the findings and conclusions of tJw trial 
in the present proceeding. 
But this court now says, as a matter of law, that the 
did not mean what they said when they used the 
word ''alimony'' in their agreement, and that the trial court 
did not mean what it said in its divorce decrees, and that 
the findings and conclusions in the present proceeding are 
without support in the record. If the agreement was without 
ambiguity, as both parties contend, the trial court had the 
power in the first instance to declare from its language 
alone the intention of the parties, and its determination should 
not be set aside unless it is unreasonable. A construction of 
the agreement on that theory alone is reasonable. However, 
each party contends that the agreement is unambiguous in 
his or her favor, and this is one test of ambiguity. The fact 
that the parties themselves each ascribe different meanings 
to the words used indicates the existence of an ambiguity. 
(Chastain v. Belmont, 43 Cal.2d 45, 51 [271 P.2d 498] ; 
California Emp. Stab. Corn. v. Walters, 62 Cal.App.2d 554, 
559 [149 P.2d 17].) 
Notwithstanding her contention that the agreement is un-
ambiguous in her favor the plaintiff at the hearing of the 
present proceeding requested the court to take extrinsic evi-
dence to aseertain the intention of the contracting parties 
as to the alimony payments. In so doing she was met by 
the construction of the agreement in the prior divorce pro-
ceedings to the unmistakable effect that alimony was not 
integrated in the agrrement. However in compliance with 
her request the trial court took extrinsic evidence. This 
it had the right to do in aid of the interpretation of the 
agreement when ambiguity is present or questionable. (Tuttle 
v. Tuttle, 38 Cal.2d 419, 421 [240 P.2d 587] ; Flynn v. Flynn, 
42 Cal.2d 55, 60 [265 P.2d 865] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal.2d 49, 
52 [265 P.2d 881] .) 
Having before it the terms of the agreement, the divorce 
rlcPrees and the extrinsic evidence, the trial court found and 
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alimony as such was not intended to 
in the agreement and was not affected 
therein waiving ''all right to future maintenance aml 
... except as herein otherwise proyided. '' The 
coulrl haYe reference only to the whieh 
provided.'' In my opinion the record 
findings and the eonclusion of il1P 
payments ·were modi:fiab!P. 
affirm the judgment. 
'HAUijjl\, ,J., Disscntiug>·IInshand m1d wi[;• are fr<'P 
competent persons to eoulract with Pa<:h othPr (Civ 
~§ 158, 159.) 'l'here is no reason why tlwy cannot enter 
into a property settlement agreement which includes a pro-
for alimony, as such, which shall be snbjcct, within 
limits, to control by the court. ]'or example, th(: 
ies could agree to a maximum limit or to a minimum limit 
or to both maximum and minimum limits, or they could in-
clndt' a cost-of-living sliding scale, the exact amount of con-
in each case to be fixed by the court if the parties 
failed to agTee. 'l'hey could also provide for security to guar-
an1 maximum payments or they could agrer that the court 
order complete termination of alimony upon the showing 
of the occurrence of some casualty. 
A eontract made by competent parties, and valid nnder 
the of contracts, does not for some mysterious reason 1w-
come subject to alteration in or disregard of its tPrms 
beennsr the contracting parties arc or WNe husband and ~wife. 
Rui when the contract by its terms provides for thP payment 
of the ordinary meaning of the word snggests that 
the amount of alimony shall remain snbject to control of 
thP unless that primar~· meaning is 
or imited by the contract. Changing thP amonnt of alimoJJ;· 
obviously is not ;m al1PratioJJ of the. eonirad wllPre 
1 he t•outract provides for "alimony" and does not ihit 
su1·h 1·hanges. 
I cannot hold that as a matter of 1aw the eontraet 
i~ noi snhject to the interpretat.ion giYen it hy the trial court. 
'l'lw eontract was not in truth made a part of the~ <leet·er ol 
divon~P. '!'he majority opinion ~tates that "'l'hr de<·n:e a p-
and incorporated by re{cnmce the provisiow:; of ilw 
agreement and expressly ordered defendant to pay $500 per 
month 'as agreed in ~aid property settlement agreement.'" 
!Tt ies n<lded.) Bnt, as I l1an> hPrdofnre poinir;rl 0111 
638 MESSENGER V. MESSENGER [46 C.2d 
, 42 CaL2d ), 
the simple fact is that an cannot be made a part 
of a unless it is in truth incorporated in the judg-
ment so that when the judgment is copied in the judgment 
book the whole of the judgment, necessarily including 
agreement which is a part of is set forth word for word. 
' 'In no case is a effectual for any purpose until 
entered.' (Code Civ. Proc., § To enter a judgment 
means to copy it in the book' so that it becomes a 
and public record Code § 668), 
so that he who reads may know its content. Any portion of 
a judgment not entered in the judgment book would be 
ineffectual for any purpose. If the clerk by error omitted 
to enter any part of a judgment which had been filed, the 
error of the ministerial officer could be corrected ; but if he 
has performed his duty and the judgment as entered is truly 
the judgment as rendered, and that judgment has become 
final, then neither this court nor any other court or person 
has power to add words to the language of that judgment." 
(Flynn v. Flynn, supra.) 
Inasmuch as the agreement was not incorporated in the 
decree, the trial court's determination in the light of the 
entire record that the order for payment of $500 monthly 
was in the nature of an award of alimony, should be upheld. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
